We i n troduce a new method for the formal development of secure systems that closely corresponds to the way secure systems are developed in practice. It is based on Focus, a general-purpose approach to the design and veri cation of distributed, interactive s y stems. Our method utilizes threat scenarios which are the result of threat identi cation and risk analysis and model those attacks that are of importance to the system's security. We describe the adversary's behaviour and in uence on interaction. Given a suitable system speci cation, threat scenarios can be derived systematically from that speci cation. Security is de ned as a particular relation on threat scenarios and systems. Security r elations covering di erent aspects as authenticity and availability are given. We s h o w t h e usefulness of our approach by developing an authentic and available server component, based on standardized cryptographic protocols.
Introduction
When developing IT-systems for security critical applications, it is of particular importance to show that the proposed solution maintains security. Formal methods can be used to prove security on a mathematically sound basis according to the underlying semantic model, provided an appropriate formalization of security is given. However, there is no general notion of security: for each application, di erent aspects of security, as con dentiality, authenticity/integrity or availability, may berelevant. Though abstract security policies may bedened, the concrete security requirements are heavily in uenced by the kind of attacks that are expected for the given system and the application domain.
Informal approaches that have been shown useful in practice are therefore based on threat identi cation and risk analysis, where the system and its environment a r e i n vestigated in detail in order to determine the kind of possible attacks, their probability, and the loss in case of the attack being performed. Thus, critical system components are identi ed for which the associated risk cannot be tolerated, leading to application speci c security requirements. 10] gives an overview of typical requirements on several security application domains. In general, mechanisms as for example access control, encryption or authentication protocols ( 8] ) have to be implemented to ensure security. It is the system designer's task to show that a speci c set of mechanisms is suitable to meet the security requirements.
A formal method for the development of secure systems that is intended to be supportive in practice should bebased on the above considerations. In particular, it should employ a de nition of security that is independent of security mechanisms and is therefore suitable to show the e ectiveness of a mechanism. It should allow the formalization of individual security notions. Additionally, and probably most important with respect to practice, such a method should o er the opportunity o f i n tegrating security analysis and functional system development by providing a clear formal relationship between security analysis results and system design speci cations. The latter can beachieved by using a general-purpose system design and veri cation method.
Formal methods achieving all these goals are currently not available. Though many approaches have been proposed during the last twenty y ears, ranging from formal security models ( 1, 9, 25] , to mention but a few) to authentication logics ( 7] ) and other special-purpose protocol analysis techniques ( 17, 24] ), they all lack the desired exibility and correspondence to system development. Recent approaches employing process algebras, CSP in particular, ( 13, 20, 16, 22, 23] ) come closer to our goals, but still are not completely satisfactory, as will be discussed later on.
In this paper, we introduce a new formal method for the development of secure systems that is intended to meet all of the requirements mentioned above. Since we are mainly interested in applications of communication systems, we utilize a general-purpose approach to the design and veri cation of distributed, interactive systems. Focus ( 3, 5, 6] ) models agents by stream processing functions and is compositional with respect to re nement. In our approach threat analysis results in the de nition of threat scenarios. They are speci ed in Focus and can be easily derived from a system speci cation. Security analysis is then performed by checking the relationship between threat scenario and system speci cation. If the security relation holds, the threat scenario can be dropped, and system development proceeds as usual. Because of compositionality, further system re nements are secure with respect to the initial threat scenario.
Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Focus method and its basic notions. The properties of the semantic model of Focus are exploited in Sect. 3 to de ne threat scenarios and several notions of security that correspond to di erent seurity aspects. Using transmission media and typical attacks on them as example, we demonstrate how threat scenario templates can be de ned. The usefulness of our approach i s s h o wn by example in Sect. 4 , where we analyse a system utilizung a simple protocol based on ISO 9798-2 with respect to authenticity. It turns out, that, depending on protocol embedment, authenticity i s a c hieved at the expense of losing availability if an attack occurs. Thus, a protocol variant is speci ed that considers timing aspects and preserves availability in case of the adversary obeying certain fairness conditions. In Sect. 5 we compare our approach t o t h e a d v anced methods mentioned above.
System Speci cation and Development with Focus
In the following, we give a short introduction to the basic notions of Focus. We de ne the concepts and notations that are used in the remainder of the paper. For further reading we refer to 3] and 5]. The reader is expected to be familiar with set theory. We use N to denote the set of natural numbers, and B = f0 1g to denote the set of bits. P(M) denotes the powerset of a set M.
Streams
In Focus, systems are viewed as consisting of components that communicate asynchronously with each other and their environment via named channels. The communication interface of a component is given by a set of (named) input and output channels. We will de ne the behaviour of a component by means of a mapping between input histories and output histories, thus describing the complete lifecycle of a system component. Communication histories of channels are modelled by streams of messages, where a stream is de ned to bea nite or in nite sequence of messages. Given a set of messages M, we de ne M ! , M and M 1 to denote the set of streams, nite streams and in nite streams of messages from M, respectively. We h a ve M ! = M M 1 When applying the iteration operator to an explicitly given one-element stream, e.g.
hai, w e often leave out the delimiting brackets and write a n instead of hai n .
Some of the above operators are overloaded to tuples of streams in a straightforward way.
In particular, #(s 1 : : : s n ) = minf#s 1 : : : #s n g yields the length of the shortest stream in (s 1 : : : s n ), and A c (s 1 : : : s n ) = ( A c s 1 : : : A c s n ) lters each s t r e a m o f ( s 1 : : : s n ) with respect to A. We use the operator (A 1 : : : A n ) c (s 1 : : : s n ) to denote the substream of those (s 1 :i : : : s n :i) that are elements of A 1 : : : A n . To select the i-th element of a tuple, we use the projection function i .
We use s t (\s is a substream of t") for two streams s and t to denote the substream predicate, which is formally de ned by s t 9 h 2 B ! : sel(t h) = s with sel being de ned by 8x 2 M ! h 2 B ! : sel(x h) = 1 ((M 1) c (x h)).
Timed Streams
If system behaviour depends on timing aspects, we n e e d t o b e a b l e t o model the progress of time in order to describe and analyse them. For that purpose, we use so-called timed streams. In timed streams, the special symbol p (\tick"), which is not an element of M, occurs.
Each occurrence of p denotes that a time unit of a particular length has passed. Messages occurring between two successive t i c ks are assumed to be communicated within the same time unit. Since time never halts, each in nite timed stream contains in nitely many ocurrences of p
. By M ! , M and M 1 we denote the set of timed streams, nite timed streams and in nite timed streams of messages of M, respectively. We h a ve M ! = M M 1 .
For timed streams, we may use all of the operators de ned on (untimed) streams, with ticks interpreted as ordinary messages. Moreover, we use s# j to de ne the least pre x of S that contains j occurrences of p . If a timed stream s models a particular communication channel within a system, s# j describes the history of that channel up to the j-th time unit. The part of a stream beginning right after the j-th time unit is denoted by s" j and formally de ned by s" 0 = s and, if j > 0, hi" j = hi, ( m _ s)" j = s" j , a n d ( p _ s)" j = s" (j;1) . By tm(s j) we denote the time unit at which t h e jth non-tick message occurs.
Abstraction from time is denoted by s, where s results from s by removing all ocurrences of p . We further de ne a timed substream predicate s t t de ning that s is a substream of t, such that each message of s occurs within the same time unit as it occurs in t. It is formally de ned by s t t 9 h 2 B ! : t s e l ( t h)) = s with tsel being de ned by tsel(hi h ) = hi, tsel( p _ t h) = p _ tsel(t h), tsel(m _ t 0 _ h) = tsel(t h), and tsel(m _ t 1 _ h) = m _ tsel(t h).
Stream Processing Functions
Focus models the bahaviour of deterministic system components by stream processing functions mapping the component's input history channels to its output history channels. In order to distinguish channels, stream processing functions usually work on named stream tuples instead of simple stream tuples. We de ne named stream tuples by assigning names to the input and output channels of a component, and de ne a mapping 2 Q ! M ! provided a set of channel identi ers Q is given. The operators on stream tuples that have beenintroduced so far are overloaded to named stream tuples, if necessary. In particular, time abstraction is lifted to named stream tuples, and denoted by for a named stream tuple To correctly re ect the behaviour of real-life components, we require for each streamprocessing function modelling a component, that its output at any t i m e j is completely determined by its input received so far, which means up to time j. If additionally a possible delay of the component is considered, requiring the output at time j + 1 being completely determined by the input up to time j, w e call the function strongly pulse driven. The requirements on strongly pulse driven functions are formally described by
The arrow s ! is used to model domains of strongly pulse driven functions.
Composition
Strongly pulse driven functions, and thus deterministic system components, can be composed using a number of di erent composition operators. For the outline of our approach, we need sequential composition, parallel composition, and feedback, which are depicted in Fig.  1 b e l o w.
? ?
? ? 
where j Y denotes the restriction of the named stream tuple to those channels contained in Y . The functions resulting from sequential and parallel composition of strongly pulse driven stream-processing functions are strongly pulse driven as well ( 6] ). Given 2Ĩ s !Õ we de ne feedback b y identifying a subset of 's output channels with a subset of 's input channels. Let X O and r 2 X ! I bea bijection that associates a subset of 's input channels with X. We t h e n d e n e X ( ) 2(I n r(X)) !Õ recursively by X ( )( ) = where = ( ] j r(X) ) :
Because of the properties of strongly pulse driven stream-processing functions, it can be shown that for each there is a unique that satis es the above equation. Moreover, X ( ) is itself strongly pulse driven ( 6] ).
So far we h a ve i n troduced deterministic components, modelled by a single stream processing function, and their composition. In order to model nondeterministic network components as well, we n o w de ne a more general model, where components are modelled by s e t s o f s t r e a m processing functions, with this set being a singleton, if the component is deterministic. Each function of the set describes a possible behaviour of the component. For a more operational view, we also introduce the notion of an input/output-behaviour describing a pair consisting of a particular input stream and a possible corresponding output stream. For a component C Ĩ s !Õ we formally de ne the set C i=o of input/output-behaviours by C i=o = f( ) j 9 2 C : ( ) = g:
The composition operators for stream processing functions are lifted uniformly to (nondeterministic) components. If C, C 1 and C 2 are appropriately de ned, we h a ve C 1 C 2 = f 2Ĩ s !Õ j 8 :
The speci c kind of the de nitions for sequential composition and feedback is provided in order to achieve full abstractness of the semantic model, see 5] and 6] for details. :: R where S is the name of the speci cation, and R is a predicate logic formula with elements of I and O as its only free variables. Semantically, a speci cation is interpreted to describe the set of strongly pulse driven stream processing functions that \satisfy" R.
Speci cations
To formally de ne the semantics of a speci cation, we rst de ne what it means for a named stream tuple to satisfy a predicate: For any named stream tuple 2 C ! M 1 and formula P, whose free variables are contained in C, w e de ne j = P to hold i P evaluates to true when each free variable c in P is interpreted as (c). We then de ne the denotation of the time-independent and time-dependent speci cation format by
respectively. Note the use of the time abstraction operator for named stream tuples in the rst line. For each time-independent speci cation, there is an equivalent time-dependent speci cation, resulting from substituting streams with their time abstractions.
Speci cations can be composed using the same composition operators as de ned for components. Since speci cations describe components, the semantics of composite speci cations is straightforward. Composite speci cations can besyntactically given in an operator style, using the composition operators, or in a constraint s t yle, using equations on named channels and renaming. Due to its better readability, the constraint s t yle is often preferred in practice.
Re nement
When formally developing systems, the notion of re nement plays a central role. Focus offers a number of re nement techniques for components and speci cations ( 4] ), of which o n l y behaviour re nement is of interest for the following exposition. With respect to behaviour re nement, a system de ned by a speci cation T is said to re ne a system given by a specication S, if each function modelling a behaviour of T also describes a behaviour of S. If T re nes S, w e w r i t e S T and formally de ne
S T T ] ] S ] ] :
In order to prove that T is a re nement o f S, i t s u c e s t o s h o w t h a t R T ) R S .
3 System Security
Development of Secure Systems
As already stated in the introduction, the development of secure systems cannot be discussed without referring to general system development activities. As the key observation we notice that system development, starting from a requirement speci cation, goes through several design steps, in each o f w h i c h the system is described on a less abstract level. We t h us yield a sequence of design speci cations S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , where each S i , i 2 f 2 : : : n g is a re nement of S i;1 . Since each re nement may introduce new components possibly being subject to an attack or specify new data types inducing additional security requirements, security analysis has in general to beperformed at each single design step. With respect to a given design speci cation S i , it is itself done in a stepwise manner, as depicted in Fig. 2 . It is guided by a set of global security requirements, which, for example, describe the relevant security aspects and the kind of information considered to be security relevant. Global security requirements are often given in form of a system security policy. In general, S i is not secure and has to be modi ed by i n troducing security m e c hanisms which c o u n ter those threats that have been identi ed as critical. The system resulting from this modi cation should be a re nement o f S i , since suitable security m e c hanisms are expected not to a ect the speci ed system behaviour. Constructing a secure system is an iterative process, since security mechanisms, as other re nements performed within system development, introduce new components and/or data to the system which m a y themselves be subject to attack and have to be secured by further mechanisms. For example, considering a cryptographic mechanism that relies on secret keys, we need a mechanism to keep these keys con dential. The single analysis steps, as shown in Fig. 2 , are described as follows. Let S i0 = S i and S ij j 2 f 1 : : : m g, denote the system speci cations resulting from each iteration within the security analysis of S i .
1. Threat Identi cation and Risk Analysis. This is an application speci c task that has to be carried out each time a security analysis is to be performed. Though classes of possible threats can be de ned with respect to component types and application domains, the actual assessment of threats and associated risks heavily depends on the given speci cation S ij . For example, if transmission media are considered, the associated risk depends, among others, on whether they are located in a secure or in a public area. Threat identi cation and risk analysis results in a classi cation of system components with respect to their criticality, and a description of the attacks that critical components may be subject to. Threat descriptions are concrete in the sense of referring to particular system components, and multiple occurences of the same kind of threat are possible (for example, if there are several communication links that are assumed to be eavesdropped).
2. De nition of Threat Scenario. The results of threat identi cation and risk analysis are used to specify a formal threat scenario B ij , in which critical components are replaced by subsystems that specify the relevant attacks. Thus, B ij models the system behaviour in a situation where all of the relevant attacks occur, which i s t h e w orst case with respect to security. Obviously, B ij is not necessarily a re nement o f S ij .
3. Security Proof. In order to proceed with system development with respect to functional requirements, we h a ve to show that S ij is secure, which is performed by p r o ving that the security property, describing those deviations in system behaviour being permitted in case of an attack (and thus being a relation between system speci cation and threat scenario), holds with respect to S ij and B ij . The concrete structure of the security property depends on the security policy and the security requirements, see Sect. 3.3 for details. If the proof fails, appropriate mechanisms have to be selected, otherwise i t h a s t o b e c hecked whether the mechanisms introduced so far give rise to new relevant threats (i.e. return to step 1).
4. Selection or Development of Mechanisms. During this activity, suitable security mechanisms are selected or developed, where \suitable" means that the mechanisms are able to counter the threats as well as that they satisfy further criteria, including non-technical ones as, for example, cost and performance.
5. Mechanism Embedment. S ij is extended by a speci cation of the selected mechanisms. We yield a system speci cation S ij+1 and, implicitly, a re ned threat scenario B ij+1 . It has to beshown that S ij+1 is a re nement of S ij . Next, the security proof (Step 3) has to be repeated with j replaced by j + 1 .
The process is nished with a secure system S im at design step i, if risk analysis does not identify further threats that have to becountered, the remaining threats are countered by non-technical mechanisms that are beyond the scope of our approach, or the remaining risk will betolerated. Thus, step 1 must always follow step 3, which ensures that new threats resulting from the introduction of mechanisms are always considered. However, it often turns out to be useful to already include such new threats in the construction of B ij+1 , which, for example, is done in Sect. 4. Additionally, in most cases it is obvious that S i is not secure, which allows to omit step 3 in the rst iteration.
Our approach aims at the formal foundation of the development steps described above. However, risk analysis and selection of mechanisms are excluded, since they heavily depend on non-technical arguments and thus are out of reach of formal treatment. Since all of the formal work is performed within the Focus framework, at each time of security d e v elopment there is a unique relationship to system development according to its functional speci cation. However, methodological issues of integrated functional and security d e v elopment a r e b e y ond the scope of this paper, and further work will be dedicated to this subject.
Threat Scenarios
A threat scenario is a modi cation of a system speci cation that describes a situation in which the system is attacked by a n a d v ersary, according to the results of threat identi cation and risk analysis. In most application cases, the threat scenario can be derived systematically from the system speci cation: threat identi cation and risk analysis are typically performed on the basis of an architectural view of the system, which means that we h a ve a compositional speci cation as starting point of security considerations. For each of the components, it can then be determined, whether it is likely to be subject to adversary actions. In the derivation of a threat scenario, the critical components will then be replaced by speci cations modelling the adversary's in uence on them.
Candidates for critical components can often be de ned on the basis of an analysis of the application domain and the type of the component, or its role within the system speci cation. This o ers the opportunity of de ning templates describing abstract attacks on the component types of interest. Using instantiations of these templates for the modi cation of critical components identi ed by risk analysis, application speci c threat scenarios can be easily constructed. Note that not necessarily each of the components of a given type has to be replaced, but if risk analysis leads to a speci c component of that type being classi ed as critical, the template can be used.
In distributed communication systems and networks, it is mainly the communication medium rather than the communicating entities (users or computer systems) that are considered to beat risk (imagine logical communication channels being implemented by using public telephone lines). Therefore, in order to perform a risk analysis reasonably, w e require the speci cation to explicitly model media as network agents, using an appropriate level of abstraction. However, this does not seem to cause problems in practice: if the medium is subject to further development, for example, if it is going to beimplemented by a protocol working on an unreliable physical medium, it will be explicitly speci ed, otherwise it can be simply modelled by a n a g e n t b e h a ving like the identity on its input. In the following, we provide a template for the construction of threat scenarios describing attacks on communication media. Given the results of the threat identi cation and risk analysis for a particular link of the system to be secured, the template can be easily instantiated, leading to an appropriate threat scenario for the given link. This will be demonstrated in Sect. The threat scenario template is based on an explicit model of the adversary, together with the initial information available to her and the set of functions she can use to compute new information. As in 17] and 24], we use an explicit model of the adversary's in uence on communication, based on the semantic model of Focus: the \data ow component" D MD speci es how the adversary in uences the behaviour of the transmission medium. For example, the adversary may insert or delete messages. Obviously, the speci cation of D MD has to take into account properties of the medium MD, indicated by the index MD. A formal speci cation of the threat scenario MD Thr , an instance of which is to replace each speci cation of a critical medium of the system analysed is given below. For better readability, the speci cation is given in constraint s t yle. 
Whenever the adversary is able to eavesdrop a message from i, modeled by the output i A of D MD , the set of messages known to her will be updated according to the functions in F.
At a n y p o i n t, the adversary may output nitely many fraudulent messages taken from the set of values known to her at that point, described by t h e nite streams d 0 , d 1 . These messages are used to in uence communication, e.g. by inserting them. The complete possibly in nite stream of fraudulent messages issued by the adversary is modeled by d. In some applications, it may turn out to benecessary to explicitly specify the in uence of the adversary on the legitimate entity's communication, for example by determining the point o f t i m e a t which a fraudulent message is inserted. We use c to model this kind of control, where data from a set of controls C are issued. Typically, w e h a ve C = B. Within the template, we do not impose further restrictions on c, h o wever, in an instantiation of the template further constraints can beintroduced.
In our template for attacks on communication channels, the data ow component D MD is not further speci ed, since the adversary's in uence on communication is considered to beapplication speci c. However, the syntactical interface of D MD (legitimate messages on i, fraudulent messages on d, and controls on c) allows all kinds of possible attacks, as for example listed in 18], to bespeci ed. Often, reliability aspects of the medium and speci c attack descriptions can beseparated, leading to a simple structure of D MD with respect to its parameter MD:
for some D' (with ID denoting the identity component, applied to input i A ). If, for example, the adversary may only insert new messages, without in nitely blocking legitimate messages, but is not able to determine the position where to insert, D' is given by the speci cation of the fair merge agent in 3], with the interface being adjusted.
This concludes the speci cation of the threat scenario template for transmission media.
Its parameters are given by the adversary's initial set of values V , the set F of functions available, the type of control messages C, and the speci cation of the data ow component D. In addition, for some applications it may be suitable to further strengthen A. Sect. 4 shows a sample use of this template.
The kind of adversary model used in the threat scenario speci cation is close to the approach t a k en in 17] and 24], where it turned out to be useful for the analysis of cryptographic protocols. Di erences occur,however, in the explicit modelling of the adversary's in uence on communication, which in our approach can be tailored to the application at hand.
The Security Property
Given a system speci cation S and a threat scenario B that has been derived from S, security can be expressed using a particular binary relation R Sec on speci cations. If R Sec (S B) holds, S is said to be secure with respect to the threats represented in B. However, the implications of R Sec (S B) on the security of a system being implemented according to S depend heavily on the concrete de nition of R Sec . In the remainder of this section we want to introduce a number of variants of such a de nition, which correspond to di erent kinds of security notions. Thus, our interpretation of security is split into two parts: a system speci c part, which relates to vulnerabilities of the system under development, the speci c abilities of an attacker to that system, and the environment of it, being modelled in a threat scenario, and a general part expressing common security requirements, beingmodelled using a particular security relation.
We start with the de nition of the most restrictive type of security, in which adversary interference is expected to have no in uence on the behaviour of the system. In this case, the threat scenario must be a re nement of the original system. 2 In practice, absolute security is usually hard to achieve, and sometimes it is even not desired: if there are interactions that are not considered to be security relevant, then an adversary may in uence these without compromising security.
If the security requirements on the application at hand are known exactly, we may use only these to de ne the system's security.
De nition 2 Given a predicate P, a system S with syntactic interface (I,O) is called Psecure with respect to a threat scenario B, with the same interface, if P(B) holds.
2
Formal de nitions can be provided for certain common aspects of security, l i k e i n tegrity, authenticity, con dentiality, o r a vailability. Using these de nitions in a security analysis, the analyst need not formalise particular security requirements, but may only use the de nition covering the aspects that are of importance to her application. Since in Sect. 4 we focus on authentication mechanisms and their impact on availability, w e provide general de nitions for authenticity a n d a vailability of a system.
We distinguish between a strong and a weak variant of authenticity. 2 With the weak authenticity de nition we m a y, for example, formalize peer entity authentication, if messages allow the derivation of the entity identi er where they claim to come from, and the abstraction function is de ned to extract this identi er from a given message.
Considering availability, we again distinguish between a strong and a weak variant. By strong availablity, we mean that for each legitimate input, there must be an appropriate system reaction.
De Note that in the case of strong availability the system is not only required to somehow react to each legitimate input in case of an attack ocurring, but also to react in exactly the same way as in the non-attack case.
However, in many practical situations strong availability cannot beachieved nor is even desired: in these cases it is su cient that at each point of time the system will eventually react to a legitimate input. If the input is provided by another component under the control of the system designer, this component may be speci ed to retransmit messages until the appropriate system reaction is observed.
To formalize weak availability, we have to switch to timed streams, in contrast to the de nitions above which refer to untimed streams only. 2 Note that both availabilty de nitions refer only to the existence of a response to a legitimate input, not to the amount o f t i m e b e t ween request and corresponding response.
Security Mechanisms
When threat identi cation and risk analysis is performed, systems, in general, turn out not to be secure. Therefore, we have to specify particular means, called security mechanisms, that are suited to counter the threats that have beenidenti ed as critical. We distinguish between technical mechanisms, which are given by a particular functionality of an IT system, and non-technical mechanisms, which are organisational or physical means located in the system's environment. As an example of non-technical means, take a messenger delivering a secret key, o r a m e c hanical door lock p r e v enting an intruder from accessing a computer system located in a particular room. In our approach, we only consider technical mechanisms, since they form a part of the system to be developed and can therefore be treated in the same way as functional requirements. However, assumptions based on non-technical mechanisms may in uence the adversary model.
A lot of basic technical mechanisms suited to meet di erent security requirements have been proposed. 8] gives a representative overview. In general, for a given security problem, there are several mechanisms that are suited to meet the requirements, di ering only with respect to non-functional criteria as performance, cost, and legal issues (patents, licences). Though these criteria may be of major importance to the application, they do not contribute to security analysis as described in the previous sections. Therefore, the selection problem is considered to be out of scope of our approach.
The mechanisms we are particularly interested in, include those based on cryptographic methods. They are based on concepts as common secrets, cryptographic keys, random numbers,nonces, and so on. In our approach, each of these concepts is modelled by a speci c data type, where the adversary's abilities on the usage of elements of these data types are restricted. Consider, for example, the set of cryptographic keys and cryptograms in Sect. 4 
A Sample Development
In this section, we show the application of the method introduced above b y giving a detailed example. We rst give the speci cation of a simple system which, however, may occur in realworld applications in a similar form. Then, a threat scenario is described, which is cticious but could as well have b e e n a c hieved as the result of a real-world threat analysis. We s h o w that our example system is not authentic without adding particular authentication mechanisms. We provide such a mechanism by specifying a challenge-response protocol with encrypted response which is a simpli cation of the ISO 9798-2 protocol ( 11]). Speci cations are given in state-transition style, which corresponds closely to the way cryptographic protocols are usually presented, and relational style, which gives a more abstract view of the protocol and is well suited for the conduction of correctness proofs. It is shown that the introduction of the authentication mechanism does not violate the original system speci cation, i.e. is a re nement of the original system. Given a simpli ed adversary model, we prove strong authenticity of the system. With a more complex adversary model, only weak authenticity can be shown.
With the proof of authenticity of the system including the authentication protocol, it turns out that availability is lost in case of an attack. We therefore have to modify our protocol speci cation by considering the timing of messages. The time-dependent protocol is then shown to be both authentic and available, with respect to some fairness assumptions on the adversary's behaviour.
In most cases, proof details are omitted. The reader may nd all the details in the accompanying technical report 15].
A Simple Server
Our example provides the speci cation of a very simple, idealized server component that is able to receive requests submitted by a client v i a a transmission medium and to respond to those requests that have been issued by authorized clients by sending results using a di erent communication channel. Since the main focus of the example is on security analysis of the server, the detailed structure and contents of requests and results are not important. However, if looking for possible applications for servers of this kind, imagine an electronic door lock which is only released upon request, for example by inserting a smart card, or a mobile phone system, in which connect requests are received by a s e r v er and, possibly supplied with additional data about the requestor, forwarded to a switching center. We assume that there Figure 4 : A simple server are several clients using the same request channel, thus each request has to betagged with the client's identi er. Figure 4 shows an abstract view of the server, consisting of a server component SV and the transmission medium MD. To formally specify the server in Focus, let Id bea set of identi ers, each of which is assumed to beauthorized to sending requests, and Req, Res represent the set of requests and results, respectively. As argued above, Req and Res are not speci ed in detail. Using the operator style of speci cation, the server is described by Note that we assume an ideal transmission medium, resulting in the component MD being simply the identity on its input channel. This has beenchosen in order to keep the simplicity of the example. Section 3.2 outlines how one may deal with more sophisticated media speci cations.
SV states that each request of an authorized client, and only those, will be served. Because of the semantic model of time independent speci cations in Focus, SV ist quite implicit: from the strong pulse-driveness constraint on functions satisfying SV it follows that requests are served in order of their receipt, and that no responses are issued in advance, anticipating future requests.
The Threat Scenario
In Sect. 3.2 we stated that each threat scenario is the result of an application speci c threat identi cation and risk analysis, where templates can beused in the construction of the scenario. Since risk analysis heavily depends on non-technical arguments, for example consideration of associated nancial loss, it is not completely covered by our method. For our example, we therefore assume that a risk analysis has beencarried out, with the supposed result of the adversary beingassessed as being able to eavesdrop the transmitted messages, to know about the set of client identi ers and requests, and to insert fraudulent messages. These assumptions are intended to completely describe the adversary's behaviour, particularly she cannot manipulate or delete messages on the input channel i in our example scenario.
Since MD models a transmission medium as discussed in Sect. 3.2, the template given there can be used to construct the threat scenario B. Thus, many messages, transmission of messages of i may be suspended for ever, this fact being re ected by using the pre x relation instead of equality with respect to i, and by extending the control sequence in the rst conjunct. On the other hand, given an appropriate control sequence, each of the adversary's messages will indeed be inserted. Potential loss of fairness is intentional, since it does not seem to be reasonable to always assume a fair adversary.
The auxiliary values n and c 0 are introduced to handle cases where the control sequence and the messages sent by the adversary do not t together, meaning that there are less 1's in c than messages in d or vice versa. However, from our speci cation of A(V), we always have So far, we have n o t i n troduced any fairness constraints on the adversary speci cation of our example, in fact, we need not assume fairness of the adversary in order to prove authenticity of the mechanism introduced below. However, fairness has to be considered when reasoning about availability in Sect. 4.3.3. S as speci ed above, which means not containing any particular security mechanism, is not authentic with respect to B, as is shown in the following theorem. 
An Authentication Protocol
In order to specify an authentic server, we have to re ne S by introducing an appropriate security m e c hanism. ISO proposes a simple challenge-response authentication protocol ( 11] ) that is considered to be suited for applications like our server. We give a speci cation of this protocol and analyse authenticity and availability in detail. A variant of this protocol proposed by 12] is discussed in 14] and 15].
Speci cation
Cryptographic Systems The protocol is based on symmetric cryptoalgorithms and pseudo random number generators, and assumes that the server and each of the clients share a secret key not known to the adversary. To model cryptographic systems, a value space as for example de ned in 24] is suited for our stream based communication model as well.
To describe the cryptographic system used in our example, let K be a set of cryptographic keys, C ra set of cryptograms, and Ms a set of messages with C r\ Ms = meaning that messages and cryptograms can bedistinguished. We have an encryption function E : K (C r Ms) ! C rand a decryption function D : K (C r Ms) ! (C r M s ). In symmetric cryptosystems, we h a ve D(k E(k x)) = x x 2 Ms C r E(k x 1 ) = E(k x 2 ) ) x 1 = x 2 k 2 K x 1 x 2 2 Ms C r: Further properties hold with high probability. Since Focus, l i k e almost all other approaches to distributed systems design and veri cation, is not intended to deal with probabilities, we have to approximate them by predicate logic formul . A reasonable idealization is to take properties that hold with high probability for granted.
It is considered to beimprobable that the adversary constructs cryptograms (by simply guessing or taking arbitrary keys and messages { which in good cryptosystems bothare of nearly equal probability) that match cryptograms being issued by legitimate users. We model this fact by
and assume that the adversary does not exploit the niteness of the set of cryptograms. Note that the latter formula is modelled to only hold for messages of Ms, and requires that Ms is of considerably less cardinality t h a n C r .
The protocols also use random numbers. We c hoose a set R of values from which random numbers are taken. For each stream r 2 R ! of random numbers, we a t least require that no duplications occur, described by P R N (r), with P R N (r) 8 Two components Ath C and Ath SV have been added to control protocol runs on the client and server side, respectively. Each time a request is received by Ath SV , it issues a challenge on r and proceeds only in the case that the next message received is an appropriate response to the challenge. Otherwise, the request will be ignored. Ath C is responsible for passing on requests and suitable responses, if challenges are received.
For simplicity of the example, we specify a slight abstraction of the ISO-protocol by leaving out optional text elds and without considering the inclusion of the veri er's identi er in the response. With the latter, we lose protection against re ection attacks, which is, however, of less importance with respect to the demonstration of how our approach works. where MD and SV are speci ed as in Sect. 4.1. For the speci cation of the new components, we assume that Ath SV will ignore requests, if they are not followed by an appropriate authentication token, and authentication tokens, if it is not waiting for them. For the moment, Ath C is speci ed to bu er all incoming challenges.
The rst version of the speci cation is given in state transition style, for this style being the one corresponding most closely to common presentations of protocol descriptions like the one in 11]. Since so far we do not refer to timing of streams, a time independent speci cation will su ce. If each client shares a secret key with the server, meaning that there is a set In the above speci cation, sequences of protocol runs are treated by i n troducing states denoted by f 1 , f 2 in Ath C and by f 3 , f 4 in Ath SV . If Ath C is in state f 2 waiting for challenges, any incoming request will be delayed until the authentication token has been constructed and Ath C set back in state f 1 waiting for requests. If Ath SV waits for a response in state f 4 , anything except the response awaited will be rejected, with Ath SV returning to state f 3 . If authentication tokens are received in state f 3 , where there are no requests remaining to be authenticated, they are simply ignored.
Relational Speci cation The state-transition speci cation given above closely follows the speci cation of 11], even in the sense of giving a rather operational view of both actors of the protocol. In order to gain a deep understanding of the protocol and to easily conduct correctness and security proofs, it is, however, often useful to take a more abstract view of the protocol by specifying those properties of the protocol that are considered to beessential in a relational style. In proofs, a relational speci cation often helps to avoid complex inductions or consideration of lots of irrelevant technical detail. A more abstract, relational speci cation of our authentication protocol is given below, indicated by superscript R. We have the client's part of the protocol speci ed by 
The rst conjunct (1) states that the authentication component does not produce messages on its own. Each message being output has occurred in the input, and the sequence of messages is kept, denoted by the pre x operator. If there is a su cient n umberofchallenges, an authentication token can beconstructed for each message, thus each input message will be output, as stated by (2) . Otherwise, if there are not enough challenges, all messages, for which a n authentication token can becomputed, are output, plus the following message (formula (3)). In other words, the authentication component at the client's side sends a message received at i, and then waits for a challenge to construct the authentication token.
If there are no further challenges, no more output is generated, otherwise the next challenge from the communication bu er is used. Messages and corresponding authentication tokens are output in an alternating way starting with a message and desribed by property (4) . (5) then describes the structure of an authentication token corresponding to the immediately preceding message m: it is a cryptogram E(k id c ), with id being the identi er component o f m, and c the corresponding challenge, where the nth challenge of r corresponds to the nth message sent along x.
A relational speci cation of the authentication component at the server's side looks as follows.
Ath R SV (v : M C r r : R z : M) ti :: #r = # M c v (6) P R N (r) (7) 8j 2 dom:z : 9l 2 dom:v : z j = v l^D (k 1 (v l ) v l+1 ) = rn (8) z M c v (9) #z = # fl 2 dom:v j v l 2 M^l + 1 2 dom:v^D(k 1 (v l ) v l+1 ) = rng (10) where rn= r #M c vj l
The speci cation states, that for each message received a challenge will beoutput (6) , and that the stream of challenges satis es the requirements on pseudo random numbers (7) . From Property (8) it follows that only those messages will be forwarded to the server component SV, that are correctly authenticated by the token immediately following the message in stream v. Correctly authenticated means that decryption of the token with k id , id being the identi er component of the message, yields the challenge expected, which for the nth message in v is the nth challenge issued. The authentication component should preserve the sequence of messages as speci ed by (9) . Assuming (9), (10) states that all correctly authenticated messages are indeed output.
From the relational speci cation of the authentication protocol, we get a relational variant SA R of the speci cation of SA by the analoguous constraint speci cation Proof of Re nement Following the method of secure systems development as described in Sect. 3.1, the rst step in order to show that the system indeed has become secure by i n troducing the authentication mechanism as speci ed above is to show that the introduction of the mechanism does not violate the functional requirements of the server. This is done by p r o ving that SA, the system including the authentication protocol, is a re nement of S, the original server speci cation of Sect. 4.1. Since we gave a relational as well as a state-transition speci cation of Ath C and Ath SV and therefore of SA, our proof is twofold: We rst show that SA is a (behavioural) re nement o f S A R and then prove that SA R is a (structural) re nement o f S . Proof. The proof is performed separately for each of the properties of the relational speci cation, generally employing induction on the structure of the input streams. Details are given in 15].
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Since we now have shown that the state-transition speci cation representing an operational view of the authentication protocol satis es the properties given by the relational speci cation representing an abstract view, it remains to show that the relational specication is a structural re nement of the original server speci cation. Note that Theorem 2 contributes to the validation of both the state-transition and the relational speci cation. Having now p r o ved that the insertion of the authentication protocol does not violate the requirements on the server, we m a y turn our attention to authenticity.
Authenticity
The Threat Scenario Revisited Since with the de nition of the security mechanism additional channels and new message types have beenintroduced, it is appropriate to update the threat scenario parameters, as already argued in Sect. 3.1. For our example, we assume that challenges are transmitted via a secure channel (remember Fig. 5 , where the threatened medium is only speci ed for the request and response channel), but that the adversary knows the set of possible random values R, a n d t h us can guess one of them. In addition, she has some keys available, but not those of the legitimate clients, and may encrypt as well as decrypt. Formally, we have the threat scenario instantiation given by V = M R K A for some K A K n K 0 , F = fE Dg, D as de ned in Sect. 4.2 In order to show the expressiveness of our approach with respect to reasoning about di erent adversary models, we will further distinguish between two di erent a d v ersary characterizations.
First, we consider an adversary with limited capabilities. This kind of adversary only inserts fake requests and immediately tries to give an appropriate authentication response. This is an appropriate characterization of a door lock secured by a card reader, where the adversary tries to insert a fake card and therefore has to wait until the door is left unsupervised. We further refer to this kind of adversary model as the simple adversary model, formally de ned by A strenghtened by The argumentation above, being driven by the conduction of the authenticity proof, shows that the protocol speci ed so far preserves authenticity at the expense of losing availability in case of an attack. This is essentially a consequence of the particular embedment of the protocol in the server environment, and could not have been detected by merely considering the protocol as given in 11]. Thus, it shows the importance of considering mechanism embedment a s w ell as the ability to deal with di erent security aspects within our approach. We further consider availability below.
Authenticity with Advanced Adversary Model Considering the advanced adversary model, given by the threat scenario instantiation including MD a Thr of Sect. 4.2, the adversary is expected to insert single messages or authentication tokens at any position within stream x. In that case, we p o t e n tially lose strong authenticity, since an adversary may force the server to accept a fake request, as long as the identi er component of the fake request corresponds to the identi er of a legitimate and correctly authenticated message. The situation is illustrated by an example.
Let i = h(id req 1 )i, x = h(id req 1 ) E (k id r n )i and v = h(id req 1 ) (id req 2 ) E (k id r n )i, t h e n ( x v) is a possible I/O-behaviour of the advanced version MD a Thr . From the speci cation of Ath R SV , we yield z = h(id req 2 )i and (i z) being an I/O-behaviour of (Ath R C MD Ath R SV ), describing the system without the server component SV. Since in our example speci cation of SV we only refer to the length of the input, authenticity is not a ected, but we will lose strong authenticity, if the output of SV di ers between req 1 and req 2 . However, weak authenticity i s p r e s e r v ed in any case, if we take f : I d Req ! I dwith f((id req)) = id as abstraction function, since a fake request will only besuccessfully authenticated if there is a legitimate message (for which the authentication token has been originally constructed by A th R C ) with the same identi er.
The insertion of single authentication tokens by the adversary of the advanced model is of less criticality. As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, the adversary cannot construct authentication tokens corresponding to any legitimate message, and even eavesdropping legitimate tokens does not help, since from P R N (r) and the properties of the cryptographic system it follows that all correct tokens are distinct. Therefore, the worst case that may occur is a fake token inserted immediately after a legitimate request, leading to the request being refused by the server. However, this does not a ect authenticity.
From the above considerations we conclude, with SA R a = (Ath R C MD Ath R SV ) denoting the system excluding the particular server component S V a n d BA a = (Ath R C MD a Thr Ath R SV ) denoting the threat scenario corresponding to SA R a , Theorem 5 SA R a is weakly authentic w.r.t. BA a and abstraction function 1 , i.e.
R w
Ath ( 1 SA R BA s ) holds. The proof follows the argumentation above, but is omitted for reasons of space.
The advanced adversary model applies in situations, in which requests and authentication tokens are transmitted via publicly accessible communication links, with mobile phone systems being an example. Since the formal analysis shows that the protocol only provides peer entity authentication, but not message origin authentication, it is only suitable in application scenarios like the one described, if there is one type of requests (as in our example where the structure and/or value of requests is not referred to), or the given request can be checked with respect to context information. Such considerations have t o b e t a k en into account when, for a given application, security requirements are de ned and the adversary model is constructed.
Availability
The reason for the potential loss of availability in the protocol as speci ed above lies in the fact that the protocol component on the client side bu ers all incoming challenges, even if there is no actual request that requires the computation of an authentication token, and that in case of the construction of a new token the oldest challenge is used. Since the server cannot distinguish between legitimate and fraudulent messages, and therefore has to send a challenge whenever a request is received, the key to increased availability lies in the de nition of what is considered to bethe appropriate challenge for a token to beconstructed by the client. It seems to bereasonable to not take a challenge that has been received at the client before the actual request has occurred, since such a c hallenge cannot be the appropriate one due to the non-zero delay, i.e. strong pulse-driveness, of both the medium and the server. Thus, the client has to take the next challenge that is received after the request. This, in fact, does not completely avoid taking the wrong challenge, but is a necessary condition for the achievement of availability.
In order to revise our speci cation of Ath R C according to these arguments, we have to switch to the time-dependent format, which allows us to appropriately formalize the notion of \next challenge received". Besides replacing streams occurring in the specifying properties by their time abstractions, we only have to replace the description of the authentication token in property ( 5 ) . The time-dependent speci cation Ath T C ignores all incoming challenges until it has issued a new request and is given by In property (17) , r" tm(x j) describes the stream of challenges after that time unit in which the message x j has been forwarded to the server, from which the rst nonp element is taken as the actual challenge.
In analogy to SA R the time-dependent speci cation of the server is given by the constraint speci cation Since taking the next incoming challenge is only a necessary, but not a su cient condition for availability, w e h a ve t o m a k e further assumptions on fairness of the adversary in order to reason about availability. We rst introduce a strong fairness condition that is su cient for strong availability.
To estimate the time between an attack occurring and the challenge resulting from that attack being received by the client, we must know the maximum time delay caused by the server on its challenge output channel r. Let dist be an upper bound on that delay, w e m a y add the property 8j 2 dom: r : tm(r j ) ; tm(M f p g c v j) dist (18) to the time-dependent version Ath T SV of Ath R SV . Besides adding (18) to the speci cation, Ath T SV is derived from Ath R SV by replacing occurrences of streams with their time abstraction.
Considering the simple adversary model, a fair adversary is then given if there are more than dist time intervals between an attack and the next legitimate request, and an attack o n l y occurs if there is no legitimate request pending. Formally, w e add the following requirement to the adversary speci cation A of the time-dependent v ersion of MD Thr . mally, from the above formula being valid, it follows that each c hallenge that has been issued with respect to a fraudulent message is received by the client before the next authentication token for a legitimate request has to be computed. Though the fairness requirement seems to be considerably strong, it is su cient in many cases in which the simple adversary model applies, namely in the door lock scenario.
From the fragments above, we straightforwardly yield a time dependent threat scenario (with simple adversary model) BA T s , corresponding to SA T and including a fair variant M D T s Thr of the threatened medium.
Theorem 7 Assuming the fair adversary, SA T is strongly available wrt. threat scenario BA T s .
Proof. The proof is given in 15].
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There may be application situations in which the strong fairness condition as it is assumed in the proof above cannot beasserted. The weak variant of availability as being de ned in Sect. 3.3 can be shown with a weaker fairness condition holding: I f f o r a v ariant of the timed threatened medium MD T s Thr , in nite input x provided, it can be assumed that in the output v in nitely many times a situation occurs for which the above fairness constraint holds, then it can be shown that in nitely many legitimate requests are indeed being served, thus satisfying the weak availability de nition of Sect. 3.3.
The time-dependent server speci cation SA T keeps authenticity as the time-independent variant S V R does. The proof follows the same line of argumentation as the proof of Theorem 4. We therefore have, with BA T s beingthethreat scenario instantiation for the timed server and the simple adversary model Theorem 8 SA T is strongly authentic w.r.t. BA T s , i.e. R Ath (SA T BA T s ) holds.
Concerning the advanced adversary model, the authenticity considerations for the timeindependent case apply to the time-dependent case as well. With respect to availability, additional fairness properties have to be speci ed in order to deal with the insertion of fake authentication tokens leading to a failing authentication for a legitimate request.
Discussion of the Example
By the conduction of the example above, including the speci cation of a server component, the introduction of a security m e c hanism (a challenge response protocol based on 11]) in order to achieve authenticity, and the development o f a v ariant of the protocol o ering availability as well, it has been shown that the approach outlined in Sect. 3 is well suited for the formal treatment of those tasks that occur within the development of secure systems. In particular, it turned out that the approach allows a ne-grained analysis with respect to di erent a d v ersary characterizations and security notions. The example points out the consequences of the adversary's behaviour to the security of the system: assuming the simple adversary model, stronger security properties have been proved than within the advanced model. Thus, the critical role of threat identi cation and risk analysis is re ected in our approach. For example, it has been clearly pointed out that the protocol provides only peer entity authentication, but that in case of the advanced adversary model message origin authentication is necessary to provide strong authenticity. Two di erent s t yles have been utilized in the formal speci cation of the protocol: the state transition style allows protocol speci cation from an operational point of view that can be straightforwardly derived from an informal speci cation as for example given in the standard documents, whereas the relational style provides a more abstract view that is well suited for analysis and proof. Providing these di erent views, protocol design as well as analysis is supported, with the formal relationship between them given by t h e Focus re nement notions. Within our method, both styles of speci cation have to consider mechanism embedment. The example demonstrates that details of mechnanism implementation are of equal importance to security as protocol design itself: The loss of availability coming along with the rst protocol variant is a consequence of the particular implementation, namely the bu ering of challenges.
The loss of availability emphasises the need of consideration of the interdependence of di erent security aspects instead of concentrating on single aspects: Though the rst variant perfectly satis es authenticity requirements, it will only be of little use in practice. It is important to notice that the conduction of the authenticity proof has turned our attention to availability considerations.
The de nition of the threat scenario template of Sect. 3.2 has turned out to be advantageous in our example: The de nition of the simple and the advanced adversary model have been de ned using the template, where the added properties only refer to the distinguishing properties of the di erent a d v ersary characterizations.
Related Work
The formal treatment of security aspects in system design shows quite a long history: in the early seventies, Bell and LaPadula presented a rst model covering con dentiality aspects ( 1] ), which since then has beenfollowed by numerous formal security model proposals, for example the non-interference model 9] and the Terry-Wiseman model 25]. All these models are similar in that they provide an abstract system description, often in terms of a state transition system, and express security properties in terms of the abstract system model, for example by specifying secure states or secure state transitions. In general, they concentrate on particular security aspects, con dentiality in most cases ( 1, 9] , 25] covers con dentiality and a rudimentary notion of integrity), or even include speci c mechanisms in the system model (for example, access control lists in 1]). Thus, they lack the desired exibility with respect to the analysis of application speci c security requirements and threat models within a general framework. Additionally, formal security models only show a vague relationship to system design and implementation. The use of an abstract system model intended to be kept as simple as possible, though covering a whole range of possible systems, and of speci c description techniques lead to the security model being isolated from functional system development, thus raising the need for explicitly de ning the relationship to a g i v en system, which i s o n l y rarely done by the model designers (one of the few exceptions is given by 2 ] ) . In our approach, security analysis is immediately based on a speci cation describing the application at hand, with the process being closely integrated to functional system development.
We view formal security models as beinghelpful with respect to discussing security notions and analysing abstract security policies, but in general they are not suited to meet the requirements on a practically applicable and useful method to the design of secure systems. This is emphasized by the fact that security m o d e l s h a ve not been heavily used in commercial practice.
A lot of research has beenperformed in order to formally analyse a particular class of security mechanisms: cryptographic protocols. This work has to beconsidered with respect to our approach, since cryptographic protocols are among the most important security m e c hanisms relevant to our desired application eld of communication systems. Authentication logics originating from 7] are the most popular technique being used for authentication protocols. They use modal logic techniques to derive the knowledge and beliefs of the protocol participants that allow the achievement of the authentication goals. Their practical relevance is due to the ease of analysis and the high degree of possible automization. Thus they are suited for the e cient analysis of protocols. On the other hand, they use a restricted communication and adversary model which allow only certain classes of attacks to be identi ed, and they do not cover con dentiality issues.
Further approaches, for example 17] and 24], address more complex attacks, including interleaved protocol execution, and con dentiality of key material. 17] models protocols as state transition systems, with transitions being enabled by the protocol entities or the adversary. The adversary's knowledge at each state ist analysed by exploiting the termrewriting properties of the underlying cryptographic system. Security analysis is then by performed by analysing reachability within the state transition system. 24] uses higher order logic to model each protocol entity's view of communication. Both 17] and 24] allow the partly automization of proofs.
Despite their technical di erences, security protocol analysis techniques satisfy the demand on strict separation of the mechanisms to be analysed and the seurity requirements the mechnanism is expected to satisfy. However, all of them use particular formalisms and/or communication and adversary models, and do not explicitly address embedment and system development issues. By their nature, they only address particular security aspects. Thus, they can only be viewed as an ingredient of a method meeting the requirements as stated in Sect. 1.
